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 The aim of this paper is to consider the implications for fiscal 
policy of a deceleration in output growth. This is an important topic, 
since membership of EMU means that fiscal policy is the now main 
policy instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation. It is relevant, 
since there are several warning signals that suggest that the 
probability of an economic slowdown has increased. Although there 
are elements that are common to other member countries of EMU, 
Ireland is a special case in many ways in view of its outlier status in 
terms of extraordinarily rapid growth over the last decade. 
Moreover, output growth has been outpaced by tax revenues and 
major public expenditure items, such that the potential scale of 
adjustment in fiscal policy is non-trivial.  
 1. 
Introduction
The major contribution of this paper is to focus attention on two 
key dimensions of fiscal policy. First, we emphasise that the 
appropriate direction for fiscal policy in the event of an output 
slowdown turns on an accurate decomposition of the dynamics of 
output and fiscal positions between trend and cyclical components. 
Second, especially in the context of EMU, we argue that the 
appropriate fiscal stance requires a disaggregation of cyclical output 
deviations between ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ shocks. In particular, we 
highlight that the restoration of competitiveness in the event of a 
negative supply shock may require a reduction in the absorption of 
labour by the public sector.  
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, 
we briefly review the evolution of Irish fiscal policy in recent years. 
Section 3 describes the economic factors that suggest Ireland is 
entering into a new phase of lower output growth. In Section 4, we 
turn to the analysis of optimal fiscal policy for a slowing economy.  
Finally, some conclusions are offered in Section 5.  
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 At one level, the health of the Irish public finances is extremely 
impressive. Most obviously, Figure 1 shows that the level of gross 
public debt has trended downwards over the last 15 years and now 
lies below 30 per cent of GDP.1 Indeed, the pace of output growth 
and the EMU-induced decline in interest rates allowed debt 
reduction to continue even in the face of the remarkable reversal in 
the primary fiscal balance during 2000-2001 (Figure 2). Since 2002, 
the primary balance has been fairly stable at a shade under 1 per cent 
of GDP.  
2. 
The Dynamics 
of the Irish 
Fiscal Position
Figure 1: Gross Government Debt as a Ratio to GDP 
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Source: AMECO. 
 
However, the stable primary balance masks a trend increase in 
the scale of government spending. Figure 3 shows that total 
government spending has increased by more than 2 percentage 
points of GDP since its trough in 2000, while Figures 4 and 5 show 
that wage government consumption and public transfers have 
increased by 20 per cent and 16 per cent respectively since 2000 
(measured as a ratio to GDP). Public investment has also expanded, 
albeit at a slower pace in the most recent years (Figure 6). 
 
1A net measure of public financial liabilities would be even lower, in view of the 
substantial assets accumulated by the National Pensions Reserve Fund that stood at 
about 13.5 per cent of GDP at end May 2007. Taken together with the assets in the 
Social Insurance Fund, the ESRI calculates net public financial liabilities to stand at 
12.8 per cent of GDP in 2006 and projected to fall to 7.3 per cent of GDP by 2008. 
This calculation does not take into account implicit liabilities, such as pensions. 
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Figure 2: Primary Balance as Ratio to GDP 
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Figure 3: Ratio of Government Disbursements to GDP 
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Figure 4: Ratio of Wage Government Consumption to GDP 
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Figure 5: Ratio of Government Transfers to GDP 
Source: OECD. 
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Figure 6: Ratio of Government Investment to GDP 
 
Table 1 shows the annual rate of nominal growth in public 
spending over 1998-2006. Taking the most recent years (2003-2006), 
total government spending has grown markedly faster than nominal 
GDP – the biggest deviation is in the public sector wage bill, which 
has been growing 50 per cent more quickly than GDP. On the other 
side, public investment has not grown in nominal terms over this 
period, in part a response to the high pace of growth during the 
1998-2002 period and in part reflecting various logistical and 
planning constraints in the public investment process.  
Table 1: Nominal Growth in Public Expenditure 
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 GDP  Total  Public  Social  Investment   
   Pay  Transfers   
      
1998  16.3  9.3  7.4  8.0  23.5   
1999  15.1  13.5  10.8  0.6  32.8   
2000  15.4  7.1  13.5  10.6  35.4   
2001  11.7  18.1  16.5  16.4  36.6   
2002  11.3  11.8  15.6  16.2  7.2   
2003  6.9  6.8  11.2  9.6  -3.3   
2004  6.3  7.7  11.3  7.6  2.1   
2005  9.2  9.7  9.9  14.6  -4.5   
2006  8.0  9.6  11.4  8.0  5.5   
      
Source: OECD. 
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The increase in public spending has been accompanied by a 
siz
er cent since 
n by 218.6 per cent.  
Fig re 7: Govern t Receipts as a Ratio to GDP 
Table 2:  Nom
eable increase in the scale of government revenues, which have 
increased from a low of 33.2 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 35.6 per 
cent of GDP in 2006 (Figure 7). Table 2 shows the annual growth in 
nominal tax revenues. Taking the 2003-2006 period, indirect taxes, 
income taxes and corporation taxes have all grown at rates that are 
roughly in line with nominal GDP growth. However, total tax 
revenue has grown 50 per cent more quickly than GDP: this has 
been made possible by the extraordinary buoyancy in capital gains 
taxes and stamp duties: the former has grown by 344 p
2002, while the latter has grow
u men
Source: OECD. 
 
inal Growth in Government Revenue 
        
 GDP  Total  Indirect Income Corp.  Capital  Stamp   
  Tax     Gains  Duty   
        
1998  16.3  13.0  13.5  9.9  21.6  37.0  26.0   
1999  15.1  15.1  13.5  10.2  31.2  67.1  33.1   
2000  15.4  14.9  11.9  13.5  13.0  54.4  21.2   
2001  11.7  3.2  0.2  2.6  6.9  5.4  10.8   
2002  11.3  4.9  10.9  -3.0  15.6  -25.9  -4.9   
2003  6.9  9.6  6.2  1.1  7.5  113.1  44.7   
2004  6.3  10.8  8.9  16.2  3.3  2.9  23.7   
2005  9.2  10.3  9.8  5.8  3.0  29.5  30.5   
2006  8.0  16.0  9.2  10.0  21.7  56.3  36.4   
        
Source: Department of Finance.  
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As is shown in Figure 8, the differential growth rates across 
categories has led to a remarkable shift in the composition of tax 
revenues in recent years. In particular, the share of income taxes in 
total tax revenue has declined from 37 per cent to 27 per cent over 
1994-2006, with the slack being taken up by a 4 percentage point 
increase in corporation tax, a 7 percentage point increase in capital 
gains tax and a 5 percentage point increase in stamp duty.  
Taken together, the rapid growth in tax revenues and major 
expenditure items in recent years has provided an extraordinarily 
favourable environment for the public sector and policymakers. 
Accordingly, the transition to a period of more modest growth may 
pose transition problems. That said, an important achievement is 
that the attainment of a low level of public debt provides a solid 
anchor in terms of fiscal sustainability. We return to these issues in 
Section 4. 
Figure 8: Structure of Tax Revenues 
Source: De
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here are clear signs that the economy is decelerating, albeit from 
a very high rate of aggregate output growth to a level that is still very 
respectable by European standards. Indeed, Figure 9 plots the Irish 
growth experience over 1998.1-2007.1: there are two clear phases 
with a breakneck rate of output growth averaging 9.5 per cent during 
1998.1 to 2000.4 and a more measured rate of expansion averaging 
5.3 per cent over 2001.1 to 2007.1. However, there is a w
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sensus that the Irish economy is entering a new phase: for 
instance, the ESRI’s Summer 2007 Quarterly Economic Commentary 
projects that GDP growth will decline to 4.9 per cent in 2007 and 
3.7 per cent in 2008, with gross national income (adjusted for shifts 
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in the terms of trade) growing at 4.2 per cent and 3.3 per cent in 
these years.  
Figure 9: GDP Growth, 1998.1 to 2007.1 
ntral Statistics Office. 
ond these near-term forecasts, there are two primary 
 since 2000, while the unit labour cost relative index has 
p of countries. The loss of 
ade data. Figure 12 plots 
Ireland’s share in global exports, in addition to key export 
destinations (EU14, United Kingdom and the United States). There 
is a clear pattern in the data, with the export share going into decline 
since 2002/2003.  
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factors that suggest that Ireland is entering a phase of moderate 
growth, bundled with a non-trivial degree of downside risk. First, 
there has been a substantial decline in competitiveness in recent 
years, as measured by relative price or wage levels. Figure 10 shows 
that Ireland’s real exchange rate vis-à-vis its major trading partners 
has appreciated by 22 per cent since 2000 if measured in terms of 
relative consumer price levels and 25 per cent if measured in terms 
of relative nominal unit labour costs. Although the appreciation of 
the euro against the dollar has had much to do with loss of 
competitiveness, there has also been significant real appreciation 
against the other member countries of the euro area. Figure 11 
shows that the consumption-based real exchange rate has increased 
by 8 per cent
grown by 14 per cent against this grou
competitiveness is also visible in the tr
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Figure 10: Evolution of Broad Real Exchange Rate Indices 
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Figure 12: Ireland's Share in International Exports 
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Second, as is illustrated in Figure 13, there has been a marked 
shift in the distribution of domestic economic activity since 2000.  
While total employment grew by 21.2 per cent over 2000.4-2007.1, 
this masks a reduction in manufacturing employment of 9.4 per cent 
and the very rapid expansion in employment in the non-market 
services sector (42.2 per cent growth) and the construction sector 
(58.4 per cent).2 While the growth in the non-market services sector 
and part of the growth in the construction sector can be tied to the 
significant increase in government spending during this period, the 
construction boom has also been financed by a private-sector credit 
boom. Figure 14 shows that credit to the household sector more 
than doubled relative to the size of the economy over 2002.1-2007.1, 
rising from 35.5 per cent of GDP to 78.3 per cent of GDP. The 
growth in credit extended to the property sector was even more 
spectacular, growing from 11 per cent of GDP to 51.5 per cent of  
GDP over this period. As noted by Honohan (2006) and shown in 
Figure 15, the credit boom in recent years has been externally 
financed to a large extent, with the scale of external indebtedness of 
the domestic banking sector ex anding rapidly. More generally, 
16 shows that the current account deficit has trended 
downwards in recent years.  
 
2Employment in the market services sector grew by 21.0 per cent during this period. 
The non-market services sector comprises public administration and defence, 
education and health. 
urce: Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF). 
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Figure 13: Sectoral Employment Shares 
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ncial Institutions (Ratio to GDP) 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
Figure 16: Current Account Balance as a Ratio to GDP  
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Taken together, the deterioration in external competitiveness a
the shift in the composition of domestic economic activity
nd 
 suggest 
that Ireland faces a period of slower economic growth over the 
medium term. In part, this can be related to the slower rate of 
productivity growth that is attainable in the services and 
construction sectors. In addition, inventory-intensive sectors such as 
construction are naturally prone to cyclical fluctuations in the level 
of activity. Real appreciation and the prospect of slower relative 
wage growth should also act to reduce the rate of immigration, 
constraining labour supply. Indeed, Honohan and Leddin (2006) 
show important interaction effects between the housing sector and 
immigration that lead to an amplification of the output cycle.  
Beyond the central projection of lower trend growth, this 
economic configuration also carries downside risks. For instance, 
while the world economy has been growing rapidly in recent years, a 
reversal in global economic conditions would pose special 
difficulties for countries with over-valued real exchange rates. For 
Ireland, this is compounded by the risk that the origin of such a 
reversal could be an unwinding of the US current account deficit 
and further dollar depreciation. Moreover, the growth in the level of 
indebtedness has increased exposure to shifts in global financial 
conditions.  
economic profile poses important challenges for the 
management of fiscal policy, which we address in the next section.  
 
he most direct fiscal impact of a decline in the rate of output 
growth is a downward revision in the path for tax revenues. The 
precise impact will depend on the source of the output slowdown. 
For instance, Girouard and Andre (2005) report estimated tax 
elasticities for Ireland of 1.44 for income taxes, 1.3 for corporation 
tax, 1.0 for indirect taxes and 0.88 for social security contributions. 
Taken together with an expenditure elasticity of -0.11 (reflecting 
increased unemployment claims), this generates a budget balance 
semi-elasticity of 0.38: a 3 percentage point slowdown in output 
growth is associated with an approximate 1.0 percentage point 
decline in the budget balance as a ratio to GDP.  
Beyond the mechanical operation of these automatic stabilisers, 
the implications of an output slowdown for fiscal policy involves 
several analytical issues. As a starting point, a key principle is that the 
optimal fiscal policy for a decelerating economy turns on 
differentiating between trend and cyclical components in both 
output and the public finances, together with an appropriate 
evaluation of initial conditions. Although it is notoriously difficult to 
cleanly distinguish between the permanent and transitory 
components of output (especially for small open economies with 
plies of capital and labour), it is likely that both factors are 
ope e in the current Irish situation. First, the strong rate of 
output growth in recent years exceeds plausible estimates of the 
trend level of output growth for the Irish economy, such that some 
element of deceleration is required to put Ireland on its trend growth 
4. 
This 
 T
Optimal Fiscal 
Policy in a 
Decelerating 
Economy 
elastic sup
rativ
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pat . Second, the adjustment process may also involve a period of 
bel
s that 
hav
cal pattern for the ratio of the budget surplus to 
GD
t 
modifications. First, if the existing levels of public spending and 
ion are off the trend path, the transition to the trend needs to 
plan’ and ‘time to 
bui
h
ow-trend growth in order to restore lost competitiveness and re-
balance the composition of economic activity.  
A baseline neoclassical model would predict that the desired 
levels of current government spending and public investment should 
approximately grow in line with trend output growth over the 
medium-term.3,4 For most expenditure items, this suggests that 
annual inflation-adjusted growth in public spending should be 
restricted to the projected rate of trend output growth. If output 
growth falls below trend, this implies a temporary increase in the 
ratio of public spending to GDP that will be eliminated with 
reversion to the trend path. This counter-cyclical pattern in public 
spending is re-inforced in the case of some expenditure item
e a natural counter-cyclical pattern (most obviously, 
unemployment claims).  
On the taxation side, the trend path for government revenue 
should approximately match the trend path for public spending.5 
Since the long-run output elasticity of aggregate tax revenues is 
approximately unity, this can be achieved by maintaining a constant 
set of tax rates that is set at the level that matches the trend ratio of 
government spending to GDP.6 Taken in combination with a 
counter-cyclical path for the ratio of public spending to GDP, this 
delivers a pro-cycli
P.  
These fiscal principles are subject to two importan
taxa
be managed. Second, there may be circumstances under which it 
makes sense to temporarily push fiscal variables away from trend 
values in order to facilitate adjustment to certain types of economic 
shocks.  
In relation to initial conditions, the prolonged period of under-
investment during the 1980s and early 1990s means that the level of 
public capital in Ireland is below its equilibrium level. Accordingly, it 
is appropriate for public investment to grow more rapidly than its 
trend path for a sustained period in order to close the gap between 
the existing and equilibrium levels of public capital, although the 
optimal convergence rate is subject to ‘time to 
t
ld’ constraints and may also be conditioned on the cyclical state 
of the economy. Moreover, since the convergence phase is of 
 
3Hunt (2007) shows that the long-term equilibrium relation between public and 
private capital stocks may not be one-to-one, with the equilibrium level of public 
capital possibly growing at a slower rate than private capital. 
4Of course, the trend output growth rate is itself a function of fiscal policy. All else 
equal, higher tax rates on elastically-supplied factors of production will be associated 
with lower trend growth. In relation to public spending, inadequate public 
infrastructure will also constrain trend output growth. 
5If the trend growth rate exceeds the trend interest rate on public debt, a modest 
primary deficit is consistent with a constant debt-output ratio. 
6See the Report of the Tax Forecasting Methodology Group. 
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limited duration, it may be efficiently financed through debt rather 
than through a taxation surge.7  
With respect to current expenditure items, the appropriate trend 
path is determined by socio-political priorities, taking into account 
the
ained, a faster pace of current spending for 
a 
nary components of fiscal policy is a widespread 
ph
ying pressures from powerful interest groups induce an 
ine
reinforced by the very strong growth in tax revenues in recent years. 
n faster rate. In 
, the appropriate scale of 
 withstand lobbying 
 trade-off between the level of the tax burden and the rate of 
trend growth. One candidate’s interpretation of the recent fiscal 
experience is that the high rate of current spending growth in recent 
years reflects a reversion to a long-term trend ratio of current 
spending to GDP. By this account, the extraordinary rate of output 
growth and the sharp reduction in debt interest payments in the late 
1990s saw current spending plummet as a ratio to GDP and the 
subsequent acceleration in current spending just reflects a catch-up 
phase. To the extent that this transition is complete, this suggests 
that current spending growth should be restricted to the estimated 
rate of trend output growth. However, to the extent that the target 
ratio has not yet been att
temporary period is consistent with optimally-designed fiscal 
policy. However, if the trend ratio of current spending to GDP 
exceeds the current level, this suggests that the tax burden also needs 
to increase as a share of GDP over the medium term.  
An alternative view is that the high rate of current spending 
growth in recent years reflects some combination of trend optimism 
(that the observed high output growth rates might persist 
indefinitely) and pro-cyclical fiscal exuberance. Pro-cyclicality in 
discretio
enomenon (Lane 2003). This tendency can be explained by a 
range of political-economy models (Tornell and Lane, 1999; Talvi 
and Vegh, 2005; Alesina and Tabellini, 2006). For instance, one 
hypothesis is that voters distrust the capacity of the government to 
efficiently absorb large surpluses during upturns and prefer some 
combination of increased public expenditure and tax cuts; another is 
that lobb
fficient loosening of the fiscal stance.8 As is emphasised by Lane 
(2003) and Talvi and Vegh (2005), such pressures are likely to be 
more intense in economies characterised by volatile output patterns, 
since the potential scale of cyclical surpluses is substantially larger 
for this group. As a highly open economy with elastic supplies of 
labour and capital, Ireland naturally fits into this category since the 
potential range of variation for both trend growth and cyclical 
shocks is quite wide.  
A pro-cyclical impetus in public expenditure may also have been 
Of course, the tax buoyancy largely reflects high output growth. 
However, it is plausible some additional temporary factors were also 
at work that propelled tax revenues to grow at an eve
 
7However, if the level of taxation is trending upwards (for example due to the 
expenditure implications of an ageing population)
borrowing is circumscribed. 
8An additional factor is that the capacity of the government to
pressure may systematically vary with the electoral cycle. 
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particular, as was shown in Table 2 and Figure 8, it is clear that the 
growth in stamp duties and capital gains taxes in recent years has 
bee
ration tax to 
the
y union than under a floating exchange rate 
(La
attainment of a low level of public debt, such fears are no longer 
 selecting the appropriate form of fiscal 
he case of negative 
n at atypically high levels. This revenue windfall is clearly 
connected to the high level of transactions in the housing market, 
rising property prices and enhanced equity valuations in the 
corporate sector.  
More generally, the importance of asset prices for tax revenues is 
increasingly evident across the group of advanced economies, both 
via direct taxes on wealth or capital gains but also through the 
impact of asset prices on consumption and other activity variables. 
For instance, Morris and Schuknecht (2007) estimate the impact of 
asset prices on tax revenues for a wide group of advanced 
economies. For Ireland, these authors find that a real estate price 
index and an equity price index have significant additional 
explanatory power for the path of tax revenues. In particular, taxes 
on financial and capital transactions are estimated to be sensitive to 
both the real estate price index and the equity price index, with 
significant short-run elasticities of 0.41 and 1.13 respectively.  
In addition, asset price movements also affect the other tax 
categories: for instance, the short-run elasticity of corpo
 real estate price index is estimated at 0.62 and the long-run 
elasticity in respect of the equity price index is estimated at 1.19. In 
addition, the short-run elasticity of direct taxes on households to the 
equity price index is significantly estimated at 0.17, while the short-
run elasticity of indirect taxes to the property price index is also 
significant at 0.19. Accordingly, a sustained revision in the path for 
wealth, asset prices and the volume of capital transactions may be 
expected to affect tax revenues across all categories. Moreover, to 
the extent that the adjustment process for these variables involves an 
overshooting phase of below-trend growth, this may involve a short-
run plunge in tax revenues before reversion to the trend path.  
In relation to the tactical deployment of discretionary fiscal 
interventions for stabilisation purposes, this debate has several 
dimensions. First, membership of the European Monetary Union 
means that Ireland no longer has the option to manage country-
specific shocks through an independent monetary policy or 
manipulation of the nominal exchange rate. For this reason, interest 
in the potential stabilisation role of fiscal policy has been re-
awakened, especially since fiscal policy may be expected to be more 
powerful in a currenc
ne and Perotti, 2003). Second, the major reduction in public debt 
over the last 15 years means that a prohibitive complicating factor 
has been removed: in the presence of high public debt, even a 
temporary fiscal expansion may be counter-productive by raising 
fears about debt sustainability (Favero and Giavazzi, 2007). With the 
present, such that a fiscal intervention may be more effective as a 
stabilisation tool.  
Third, in terms of
intervention, it is important to correctly identify the source of the 
deviation of output from its trend path. In t
    FISCAL POLICY FOR A SLOWING ECONOMY 21 
demand shocks – such as a recession in destination export markets – 
a temporary reduction in expenditure taxes or a shift in the timing of 
public spending may in principle play a helpful role. In contrast, if 
output is below trend due to a supply shock – such as a loss of 
competitiveness – then the fiscal prescription is quite different. In 
relation to public spending, there is evidence that a reduction in 
wa
ates is 
des
cially 
eff
ely that such discretionary interventions are likely 
to 
ge government consumption can relieve labour cost pressures in 
the private sector, stimulating competitiveness (Lane and Perotti, 
2003, International Monetary Fund, 2006). Accordingly, it may be 
useful to temporarily restrict the growth of wage government 
consumption to below its trend path in order to facilitate a re-
balancing of the economy towards the export sector. In contrast, to 
the extent that public capital formation is directed at productivity-
enhancing projects, the restoration of competitiveness may be 
facilitated with a level of public investment that may even 
temporarily rise above its trend path.  
With respect to the tactical use of tax instruments in the event of 
a supply shock, it is clear that a counter-cyclical pattern in tax r
tabilising, since hiking tax rates during a downturn may amplify 
the output contraction and a temporary decline in taxes during a 
boom merely adds to overheating pressures. Indeed, this is the basis 
for the well-known tax-smoothing hypothesis that, for a given path 
of government spending, tax rates should be held constant over the 
business cycle (Barro, 1979). However, given the lack of alternative 
instruments, there is growing interest in the design of pro-cyclical 
tax rates. For instance, the European Economic Advisory Group 
(2007) endorses the use of internal devaluations by which the labour 
costs facing firms are reduced via a reduction in the tax wedge 
between take-home pay and the total cost of employment. In 
addition to a reduction in labour taxes, additional measures might 
also include a cut in corporation taxes. These may be espe
ective in a highly-open economy with internationally-mobile 
capital and labour.  
Of course, this general strategy was successfully implemented in 
Ireland during the 1990s, with major reductions in marginal tax rates 
an important ingredient in shifting Ireland onto a high-growth trend 
path. The key difference is that the temporary deployment of such 
fiscal instruments at the cyclical frequency is consistent with a range 
of trend paths for aggregate taxation and output growth: if the 
socio-political equilibrium involves a higher average tax burden, the 
competitiveness boost provided by an internal devaluation can be 
reversed once the economy has returned to its trend path.  
However, there are several difficulties in implementing such 
tactical fiscal interventions. First, lags in the formulation and 
implementation of fiscal policy mean that a fiscal intervention may 
turn out to be ill-timed – the economy may have already entered an 
autonomous recovery before the ‘rescue package’ takes hold. For 
this reason, it is lik
be useful only in the event of supply shocks that are sufficiently 
large and persistent in nature. Second, the dynamics of the political 
system may induce an element of hysteresis in taxation and spending 
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levels – a temporary policy may prove difficult to reverse.9 This has 
led to calls to delegate the cyclical element of fiscal intervention to 
technocrats, by the same logic that delegates monetary policy to an 
independent central bank.10 Third, the empirical literature does not 
provide a clear guide as to the quantitative effectiveness of fiscal 
instruments (Perotti, 2007). This confers considerable uncertainty as 
to the success of any candidate intervention.  
Going beyond direct budgetary instruments, the government has 
several additional options in restoring competitiveness and 
mitigating the employment impact of an economic slowdown. Along 
one dimension, productivity would be improved and business input 
costs reduced by tackling monopoly rents in non-manufacturing 
sectors through pro-competition policies. Since Table 3, shows that 
Ireland is ranked second only to Greece in terms of regulatory 
barriers in these sectors, there is considerable scope for pro-market 
reforms. In related fashion, a useful step in restoring 
competitiveness is the improvement of productivity in public sector 
activities, which would relieve the pressure on the labour market 
from the public sector. In this regard, the implementation of the 
recommendations from the in-progress OECD Review of the Irish 
Public Sector is a major priority.  
Table 3: Barriers in Services Sector 
  
Country   REG 
  
Greece  4.1   
Ireland  3.2   
France  3.0   
Switzerland  2.8   
Portugal  2.6   
Italy  2.6   
Austria  2.4   
Finland  2.4   
Norway  2.3   
Japan  2.2   
Belgium  2.1   
New Zealand  2.1   
Spain  2.0   
Sweden  1.9   
Canada  1.9   
Germany  1.7   
Denmark  1.6   
Netherlands  1.6   
Australia  1.5   
United States  1.4   
United Kingdom  1.0   
  
 
5 point scale. Source: Conway and Nicoletti (2006).  
 
 
 
9Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) provide empirical evidence on the importance 
of fiscal ratcheting. 
10See Lane (2006) for a discussion of this literature in the context of EMU. 
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An additional extra-budgetary policy challenge relates to the rapid 
growth in the minimum wage in recent years. Table 4 shows that 
Ireland has a high minimum wage relative to other advanced 
economies.11 While Table 4 also shows that 97 per cent of Irish 
workers earn more than the mandated minimum, an economic 
slowdown that reduced demand for unskilled labour could lead to a 
situation where the level of the minimum wage represented a more 
substantial barrier to employment. Under such circumstances, it may 
be effective to re-assess the appropriate growth path for the 
minimum wage.12  
Table 4: Minimum Wage Levels in Europe, 2006 
  
 Monthly Rate 
% Binding 
Luxembourg  1,570  11 
Ireland  1,403  3.3 
UK  1,361  1.8 
Netherlands  1,301  2.2 
Belgium  1,259                       n/a 
France  1,254  16.8 
Greece  668                       n/a 
Spain  666  0.8 
Malta  585  1.5 
Slovenia  522  2.8 
Portugal  470  4.7 
Czech Rep  288  2 
Hungary  258  8 
Poland  246  2.9 
Estonia  230  4.8 
Slovakia  217  1.7 
Lithuania  174  10.3 
Latvia  172  12 
Romania  114  9.7 
Bulgaria  92  16 
   
 
S stat.  
e efficient deployment of cyclical fiscal policy can be 
b d in the context of a suppor socio-political 
e ent. The well-established social partners echanism has 
t tial to enable fiscal policy to play seful role in 
m g deviations of output from its trend pa en if different 
g legitimately disagree about the nature hat trend path 
i mal size of government and ructure of the 
tax system. Indeed, this role is very much in the spirit of the original 
motivation for the modern phase of social partnership, which was to 
ad the Irish economy out of the deep slump of the mid-1980s. 
 
11Th imum wage has increased even further during 2007, with step increases in 
Janu d July 2007. 
12The union movement supports the recommendation of The Minimum Wage 
Commission that the minimum wage should be set at 60 per cent of average 
lear whether earnings in the industrial sector is an appropriate 
ource: Euro
 
Clearly, th
chieveest a tive 
nvironm hip m
he poten  a u
inimisin th, ev
roups may  of t
n terms of the opti the st
le
e min
ary an
industrial earnings. Since the industrial sector is in decline relative to the aggregate 
economy, it is not c
target for an economy-wide minimum wage. 
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Wh
h output growth. Accordingly, there is a clear 
 towards a lower 
end ratio of public 
spending to GDP, with t e attendant implications for th  
tax burden. Second, we have argued that there may r 
l interventions  the cyclical deviations of 
 its trend path. To the extent that comp veness 
rive Ireland below its trend, the required fiscal 
 may involve be rowth ment 
ption. Relative to al trends, the sc f the 
ent in the growth of th lic sector pa rge.  
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